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EU-Russia Energy Relations in Context
ROLAND DANNREUTHER
Centre for the Study of Democracy, University of Westminster
The central focus of this Special Section is an analysis and critique of the dominantly geopolitical and 
realist explanation of EU-Russia energy relations. The articles all address, whether directly or 
indirectly, this central theme and offer a number of differing perspectives and approaches. The 
objective of this final concluding article is threefold; first, to set out the broader international 
developments in relation to global energy security that have contributed significantly to the tendency 
towards a geopolitical framing of EU-Russia energy relations; second, to draw out and integrate the 
various perspectives offered by the different articles in this special section and to highlight the main 
findings and conclusions; and third, to assess what implications there are for analysing and 
reconceptualising European and international energy security in the light of these findings and 
conclusions.
The return of energy geopolitics
In terms of recent history, the increase in tensions over EU-Russia energy relations has to be 
understood as part of a wider global phenomenon. During the 1980s and 1990s, oil prices were 
generally low, OPEC’s power was greatly reduced not least due to increased non-OPEC production, 
and the dominant political and economic ideology promoted liberalization, deregulation and 
privatisation. The collapse of the autarchic Soviet system was just the most dramatic example of the 
apparent ascendance of liberal capitalism over alternative statist economic systems. The hitherto 
secretive and state-controlled Soviet energy production was made open to private and foreign investors 
for the first time since the Bolshevik revolution. Globally, fears of energy security appeared to have 
been replaced by a general optimism that the newly freed global markets would ensure energy security 
and would frustrate geopolitical or neo-mercantilist attempts to disrupt the reliable supply of energy 
to world markets.1
This optimism was, though, severely dented during the 2000s. From a low point of under $10 a barrel 
in 1998, oil prices rose rapidly during the decade to reach a peak of $148 a barrel in 2008. This 
strengthening of demand for oil and other energy resources, and the resulting impact on prices, shifted 
the balance of power significantly from the energy-importing to the energy-exporting states. As a 
result, a significant number of energy-producing states sought to strengthen state control and influence 
over their domestic energy sectors. The strengthening of the Russian state’s control over its oil sector, 
most clearly evident in the dismantlement of Yukos and its integration into the state-owned oil 
company, Rosneft, was part of a broader global phenomenon of ‘resource nationalism’ and the 
assertion of sovereign rights over national natural resources. In Latin America, in countries like 
Venezuela or Bolivia, and in Central Asia and Africa, there were similar moves towards greater state 
control and the weakening or barring of private and foreign access to resources.2 The rise in resource 
nationalism also often merged with a more assertive anti-Western political agenda, emboldening 
populist authoritarianism and statist economics. As such, the growing opposition to the West in Russia 
under Putin’s rule was part of a more general global phenomenon.
The 2000s heralded another significant shift in global energy politics. This was the ascendance of 
China, and other emerging powers such as India, as major energy consuming states. Previously, the 
main energy-importing states were Western states, most notably the United States, Europe and Japan. 
In the major energy security crises of the 1970s, it was natural that the West should act collectively 
and in solidarity to respond to these crises. In the 2000s, the dynamics were fundamentally different.  
It was now emerging Asia, particularly China, where global economic growth and energy demand 
were exponentially increasing. The new consumers, such as China, did not necessarily share the 
dominant Western approach to energy security and were willing to adopt a more neo-mercantilist and 
geopolitical approach.3 Their preferred vehicles for ensuring energy security tended also to be state-
owned national oil companies rather than the Western preference for private international oil 
companies.4 Russia was again not unusual among oil and gas-producing states to see China’s rapidly 
growing energy import demands as a major opportunity not only economically but also politically.
For the particular case of Russia, these global trends promoting a geopolitical approach to energy 
security also had regional drivers and dynamics. During the 2000s, Russia became increasingly 
estranged from European and Euro-Atlantic integration processes. As NATO and the EU expanded 
and incorporated more members from Central and East Europe, so the relationship between Russia 
and Europe, and between Russia and NATO and the EU, became more tense and distrustful. There 
was as a consequence, a significant shift in the quality of relations between the EU and Russia from 
the 1990s to the 2000s which mirrored the growing levels of anxiety in the EU over energy security. 
During the 1990s, the EU generally approached Russia with a benign and sometimes indulgent 
paternalism, believing that Russia would eventually follow the path of the other CEE states in 
converging with Western economic and political values. The energy inter-dependence between Russia 
and EU was viewed, in this period, as a major driver and catalyst for such convergence. However, by 
the late 2000s, and particularly after the series of gas disputes between Russia and Ukraine, the EU 
increasingly viewed Russia as moving in a more isolationist and exceptionalist direction, hostile to 
European values.5  In this changed context, the energy inter-dependence became viewed as a serious 
source of European vulnerability through which Russia could assert its interests and influence and 
weaken European solidarity, particularly among CEE states.
The overall consequence of these various global and regional dynamics is that EU-Russia energy 
relations have been increasingly framed in geopolitical terms. The dominant picture is of two power 
centres, Russia and the EU, following and promoting two contrasting models and paradigms for 
European energy security.6 The EU is presented as a defender and promoter of a classical liberal 
framework, where energy security is assured through liberalization, deregulation and promoting 
transnational market and regulatory frameworks. Russia, in contrast, is presented as promoting an 
unreformed geopolitical and realist approach, seeking to enhance its influence and power through the 
‘Achilles heel’ of Europe’s energy dependence on Russia. In this geopolitical struggle, Ukraine acts 
as the strategic epicentre, a country pulled variously to Europe or back to Russia, and where the major 
instrument that Russia has is its ‘gas weapon’ so as to place pressure on both Ukraine and the EU. 
Going beyond energy geopolitics: the contributions of this volume
It is this dominant geopolitical and realist framework that the various contributions to this Special 
Section seek to assess and critique. One criticism of the geopolitical and realist traditions is its tendency 
towards ahistoricity, failing to take into account the historical evolution of international politics. In the 
case of Russian-EU energy relations, Sharples provides a critical historical perspective by comparing 
the European and the Chinese gas markets for Russia, making the often forgotten point that almost no 
progress has been made in developing the Chinese market for Russian gas. The infrastructure required 
for significant Asian exports is decades away, and it is improbable that the gas currently directed to 
European markets will be transported eastwards for Asian markets. The idea of a simple geopolitical 
switch by Russia from Europe to China lacks economic logic. 
It is not just that Russia’s European markets are more developed and intensive compared to those in 
China. It is also that Russian-EU gas relations have a historical depth and institutionalisation that 
creates its own logics of continuity and durability. The origins of Europe’s dependence on Russian gas 
goes back to the heights of East-West hostility during the Cold War in the 1970s and 1980s. In spite 
of this highly distrustful political environment, there was at that time a genuine and compelling mutual 
economic interest that underpinned this commercial relationship. The Soviet Union had abundant 
supplies of gas but lacked the capacity to construct the steel pipes and compressor stations to keep the 
gas flowing, while Europe had the market for gas and the technology to ensure that the gas reached 
these markets. As Sharples notes, ‘The relationship between the Soviet gas industry, with its seemingly 
limitless gas reserves, and European energy companies, with their technology and willingness to pay 
hard currency for Soviet gas, paved the way for the development of Soviet gas exports to Europe’.7 
This path dependency continues to the present day. Alternatives to Russian gas, if the EU really sought 
to divest from Russia, would be expensive and difficult to set up and create new vulnerabilities. It 
would also take away one of the potentially most significant avenues for the EU to influence Russian 
behaviour. In this regard, Russia has similarly a strong interest in ensuring that, despite any political 
differences it might have with the EU or NATO, it remains a reliable and trustworthy energy supplier. 
Casier makes the interesting point that, at precisely the moment in 2014 when a serious geopolitical 
and military conflict did split the EU and Russia, the perception that the threat came from Russia’s 
energy ‘weapon’ actually decreased. The dominant mood in both Russia and Europe was that it was 
important to keep energy out of the conflict and to ensure that this vital economic inter-dependence 
was not harmed by the deterioration in political relations. Drawing broader conclusions from this, 
Casier highlights how the perception of Russia as an energy security threat has generally acted as a 
proxy for a more generic and ideological disenchantment with Russian political behaviour rather than 
a concrete analysis of the fundamentals of Russian-EU energy relations.8 Once a real-life political and 
military crisis emerges, as in 2014, the durability and embedded institutionalisation of EU-Russia 
energy relations has actually been affirmed rather than undermined.
If there is an important ‘path dependency’ between Western Europe and Russia in terms of its energy 
relations, this is even more the case potentially for the former Warsaw Pact and Soviet states who are 
now part of the EU but whose energy relations were constructed during the Soviet period. Kama brings 
out this complex inter-relationship through an analysis of Estonia’s energy security policy. Estonia’s 
has a deserved reputation as one of the most radical of the CEE countries in implementing the neo-
liberal market policies of the EU but, as Kama notes, its energy security policy is in marked contrast 
to this. Estonia has significant domestic supplies of shale oil, which make up almost 90% of electricity 
production, and the Estonian government has been strongly committed to maintaining state control 
and resist EU policy prescriptions for liberalization, unbundling and privatisation. Kama highlights the 
paradox of an industry which was created by the Soviet Union, inherits much of the negative 
environmental costs from Soviet production practices, but is strongly defended as a bulwark of 
Estonia’s independent sovereignty, patrimony, and a guarantor of its national security. The result is an 
energy security policy which is closer in spirit to that of a Russian statist than a liberal EU model. As 
in Russia, the dominant political tendency is the desire for state control, there is a close and intimate 
relationship between the national oil company and the state and a strong political and economic 
resistance to liberalization and diversification. 
The case-example of Estonia illustrates the wider point that each individual country in CEE and in the 
EU has a complex set of historical ‘path dependencies’ in its energy sector, specific and particular 
state-company and state-market relations and philosophies, and differing national conceptions of 
energy security. Energy security, and the appropriate energy relationship with Russia, is not something 
simply formulated and imposed supranationally by the EU; it is debated, formulated and implemented 
at national levels influenced by the relative power of differing constituencies within the country. This 
does not mean that the energy security debate is static and pre-determined. Kama notes that in Estonia 
there is a dynamic and evolving debate but that the choices are ‘not so much foreclosed by 
supranational authorities than made through the reconfiguration of national expertise, during which 
the binary between market and non-market modes of energy governance is vigorously tested and 
renegotiated’9. Similarly, in other CEE and EU states, it is the specificities of the national context and 
the political culture which is critical for understanding the particular and distinctive approach to 
Russian-EU energy relations. Geopolitics is only one, and not always the most important, dimension 
of this.
This brings out a more general theme that emerges from this Special Section. This is the need to 
recognize the complexity of the mix of actors and processes in understanding the phenomenon of 
Russian-EU energy relations. A geopolitical framing tends to simplify this more complex reality. 
Casier notes that the actors involved are not just governments and companies but include consumers, 
retailers and regulators, and their interaction is framed not just by issues of ownership and control but 
through a complex array of regulatory and pricing mechanisms. This complexity of the policy 
environment is brought out particularly well by Romanova, who argues that Russia adopts not only 
geopolitical but also non-geopolitical legalistic and technocratic approaches. For Romanova, Russia 
and the EU are influenced in their policy-making by a geopolitical and ideological agenda but that 
there is also a tendency to resolve differences pragmatically through more legalistic and technocratic 
approaches. In this more complex environment, actors like Gazprom, who are generally viewed as 
mere instruments of the Russian state, emerge as having a degree of autonomy in seeking to find 
pragmatic solutions and compromises over contested issues between Russia and the EU. 
The nature of Russian-EU energy relations needs also to incorporate the differences between differing 
issue areas. Romanova extends her threefold policy framework (geopolitical, legalistic and 
technocratic) to illustrate how Russia has adopted different approaches to different issues.10 In her 
analysis, these differing issues differentiate the Russian approaches between issues over ownership as 
against the operation of grids; between the Nord Stream as against South Stream; and over gas pricing 
mechanisms. The need to incorporate this more complex and differentiated understanding of Russian-
EU relations is developed further in the article by Hadfield. She makes an important distinction 
between those issue areas of EU-Russia interaction which illustrate progressive and regressive EU-
Russia strategic cultures. In the former progressive strategic culture, there are the EU policies of the 
Northern Dimension, the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (1994), and the EU-Russia energy 
dialogue. The more regressive and conflictual category includes initiatives like the Energy Charter 
Treaty, the European Neighbourhood Policy, and the EU acquis in the internal energy market with the 
successive liberalisation packages. Hadfield argues that the more positive gains in developing a 
common strategic culture are not forgotten even at times of considerable tensions and conflict, since 
‘the EU-Russia strategic energy culture is […] never more evident than when both sides are locked in 
vicious agreement about how to interpret and manage it’.11
The final layer of this more complex framing of Russian-EU energy relations includes an accurate 
assessment of European dependence on Russia and the particularities of national and European energy 
systems. Casier notes that the perception of a geopolitical Russian energy threat needs to be put into 
perspective taking into account the fact that Russia only accounts for 6.5% of the primary energy 
consumption in the EU, and its share of gas imports is about one third (31.5%). Even when certain 
CEE states are 100% dependent on Russian gas imports (Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia and Finland), only 
Latvia at 32% has more than a 30% dependence on Russia for its overall energy consumption. As 
Kama highlights in her article, Estonia has a significant degree of energy independence which is it is 
very reluctant to lose. And some of the CEE countries that have the greatest suspicions and distrust of 
Russia’s energy policies, such as Poland, actually have some of the lowest levels of energy dependence 
on Russia.  As the Polish case shows, the construction of Russia as an ‘energy security threat’ is not 
always entirely politically innocent. As Maltby and Khrushcheva note, Poland’s continuing 
dependence on coal for its electricity generation has resulted in seeking to water down the EU’s 
decarbonisation agenda, which can usefully draw on the argument that Poland’s indigenous supplies 
of coal help to provide security against excessive gas dependence on Russia. 
This leads to the final point that energy security has also to incorporate the complexity not only of 
energy systems but also the interaction of these energy systems with human systems and to incorporate 
potential ensuing negative externalities, such as the threat of unmitigated climate change. Maltby and 
Krushcheva highlight the fact that the EU and Russia are much further apart in terms of their climate 
change mitigation and decarbonisation agendas than in their fossil fuel relationship.12 While EU has 
taken a strategic lead in climate change negotiations and set out ambitious goals, Russian ambitions 
and interests in this area are more muted, with support for the agenda being driven by an almost 
exclusively instrumental rationality whereby decarbonisation supports greater domestic energy 
efficiency and thus increases the levels of energy exports. For Russia, the EU’s decarbonisation agenda 
is a significant potential threat to future European gas and oil demand. Thus, while decarbonisation is 
an integral part of the EU’s conceptualization of energy security, for Russia it is often viewed as a 
direct threat to its own energy security concerns. Not unsurprisingly, as Maltby and Khrushcheva note, 
there has as a result been no effective institutionalization of the Russian-EU non-hydrocarbon energy 
relationship.
Rethinking Russian-EU Energy Relations
While it is important to incorporate these differing layers of complexity and differentiation, it is vital 
not to forget that geopolitics remains central to Russian-EU energy relations. Although there is a 
tendency to exaggerate Russia as an ‘energy superpower’, the fact that Russia is a major energy 
supplier to Europe is a source of its national power and regional influence. But this needs also to be 
counter-balanced by recognition that the EU’s energy market is a source of its own power and strength. 
The EU policies that structure the regulatory frameworks for this internal energy market, as well as 
over other issues such as climate change, have powerful independent impacts on interested external 
stakeholders, not least on Russia. As a non-member of the EU, and not present or part of the policy 
and governance structures of the EU, Russia has only a limited voice or capacity to influence the 
eventual decisions taken. Although the EU is often depicted as a ‘civilian power’, whose influence 
comes from its ‘soft’ power as against Russia’s promotion of its ‘hard power’, the EU’s regulatory 
powers in the economic sphere can appear very ‘hard’ on neighbouring non-EU states.
EU-Russia- energy relations also cannot be divorced from developments of the bilateral relationship 
more generally. Distrust and suspicion in their mutual energy relations have grown as Russia has 
become more suspicious about the political and economic intentions of the EU and, for its part, the EU 
has increasingly viewed Russia negatively as challenging and opposing the EU’s core values. In this 
regard, the Russia-Ukraine gas disputes have tended to be seen as part of a broader struggle between 
Russia and the EU over whether Ukraine remains umbilically tied to Moscow or moves westwards. 
Energy and geopolitics have inevitably become fused and integrated, not least in the popular mind. 
Nevertheless, as this Special Section demonstrates, there has also been a strong resolve, in both 
Moscow and among EU capitals, to try to ‘insulate’ these energy relations so they do not become 
victims of the broader geopolitical environment and to reach pragmatic solutions which emphasise the 
technical and commercial rather than political.
The overarching conclusion that that can be drawn from this Special Section is that it is important to 
move away from essentialising Russia and the European Union. The EU is composed of a multiplicity 
of different nation states with their own interests and values, which is particularly evident in their 
energy sectors which remain a site of considerable national sovereign power. Russia itself is also more 
differentiated than is often assumed, with differing actors seeking to promote distinctive approaches 
in their policy making, as is brought out well by Romanova. It is important, therefore, that the general 
and abstract frames drawn from International Relations, that tends to pit a ‘liberal’ EU against a 
‘realist’ Russia, are supplemented and qualified by an historically sensitive political economy 
approach which grounds the analysis in the concrete realities of the historical constitution of the 
complex web of energy infrastructures and cultures. What emerges from this are patterns of continuity 
and change which do not follow the presumed trajectories of the ‘grand narratives’ that mark past and 
current periods, such as the Cold War and the post-Cold War, or the competing dynamics of 
globalization and liberalization as against resource nationalism and sovereignty. The underlying reality 
of Russian-EU relations subverts these expected patterns of behaviour and have a greater degree of 
durability and sustainability than is often assumed. 
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